THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL DEM0CRACY

    This essay proposes that the cultural crisis of Western civilization and liberal democracy is due to a lack of comprehension of the intimate interrelationship between culture, religion, and politics. In an era Richard John Neuhaus designates as The Naked Public Square (1986), where some perceive Christian symbols as violating the separation between church and state, it is timely to recall Jacques Maritain's thesis of the compatibility between Christianity and democracy, and explore his notion of Christianity as a necessary moral and spiritual underpinning of liberal democracy. As this thematic volume of the Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies elucidates, Maritain's Thomistic synthesis of liberty and tradition focuses on the transcendent dignity of the human person, universal human rights, the slow building of institutions of liberty, reform, and gradual progress. Maritain's Christian humanism and personalism thus span two poles–liberal and conservative–rooted in the natural law and natural rights traditions. Maritain was optimistic concerning democratic prospects for humanity provided that a society's cultural habits were grounded in a theistic conception of human personhood, consociality, the moral "ought," and spiritual growth. He was impressed particularly by the American experiment and hopeful for the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights which he helped draft. The question arises: Can Maritain's integral humanism bridge the gap between liberal and conservative, secular and faith-based visions of the good life, individual fulfillment, and a more perfect commonwealth in the twenty-first century? In brief, does liberal democracy require a transcendent moral-spiritual vision?

    In his engaging 1949 APSA address, Maritain outlines the essential relationship between Christianity and democracy. In Maritain's view, it is the Gospel or the Christian leaven which has awakened the secular, temporal consciousness to supreme moral principles and the real content of democracy understood as the earthly pursuit of Gospel truths concerning the transcendent origins and destiny of man and society. Christianity teaches the inalienable dignity of every human being fashioned in the image of God, the inviolability of conscience, the unity of the human race, the natural equality of all men, children of the same God and redeemed by the same Christ, the dignity of labor and the dignity of the poor, the primacy of inner values and good will over external values, universal brotherhood, love, and justice. Maritain distinguishes between the procedural aspects and the substantive content of democracy, but anchors the Gospel vision in the free exercise of rational and moral faculties as key to democratic self-government. He cautions that without a superior moral law by virtue of which men are bound in conscience toward what is just and good, the rule of the majority runs the risk of being raised to the supreme rule of good and evil, and democracy is liable to turn to totalitarianism, that is, to self-destruction. Maritain concludes that what has been gained for the secular consciousness, if it does not veer to barbarism, is the sense of freedom consonant with the vocation of our nature.

    Maritain's vision of the good society and human flourishing rooted in the Gospel message may sound archaic to postmodern ears. The main reason is that the relationship between culture, religion, and politics is no longer understood, but moreover, has become a contested battlefield of what some call "culture wars." If one recalls the etymology of the three major concepts, their import becomes clear. Culture derives from the Latin cultus or to cultivate; religion derives from the Latin religio or to bind; and politics derives from the Greek term for polis or the city.

    A long line of thinkers have explored the interrelationships between culture as ways of life; religion as the heart of culture and the ties that bind individuals and communities, and man as a political animal. Thinkers from Maritain and Neuhaus, to George Weigel and Dinesh D'Souza, among others, bemoan the increasing secularization of Western culture, the commercialization of life, the materialism, atheism, nihilism, self-absorption, and moral-ethical relativism of postmodern subjectivity, science and technology as the only measures of rationality, with no room for transcendent moral guides, human telos and destiny, or the sacred. The result is a radical devaluation of all values, including man himself. As Brian C. Anderson writes, Western societies are "troubled, even threatened, by internal discontents: egalitarian fantasies, moral libertinism, an arid secularism, and a ‘suicide' of culture" (2007: viii). Yet Anderson remains optimistic concerning the future of liberal democracy in America: "The United States differs from other liberal democracies in its religiosity, its vigorous civil society, and its remarkable history of constitutionalism, all of which has unified a diverse nation and helped make it both powerful and free" (2007: viii).

    Others are less optimistic about Western prospects for liberal democracy due to rapid secularization and the erosion of Christian moral and religious foundations. As Weigel notes in the The Cube and the Cathedral (2006), this process of de-Christianization is well advanced in Europe. The 2004 Constitution of the European Union makes no mention of God or Europe's Christian heritage. Jürgen Habermas surprised his audience when he cautioned against "an unfair exclusion of religion from the public sphere" (2003: 109). Unexpectedly, Habermas confirms Maritain's proposition that Christianity is necessary for sustaining the core values of Western civilization and liberal democracy:

"For the normative self-understanding of modernity, Christianity has functioned as more than just a precursor or catalyst. Universalistic egalitarianism, from which sprang the ideals of freedom and a collective life in solidarity, the autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, the individual morality of conscience, human rights and democracy, is the direct legacy of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love. This legacy, substantially unchanged, has been the object of a continual critical re-appropriation and reinterpretation. Up to this very day there is no alternative to it. And in light of the current challenges of a post-national constellation, we must draw sustenance now, as in the past, from this substance. Everything else is idle postmodern talk" (2002: 148-49).

    Ironically, by denying its Christian moral and spiritual heritage, Europe appears defenseless in the face of cultural colonization by its growing Muslim minority population which asserts its own traditions, including Islamic law or shari'a which merges church (mosque) and state, concentrates political power, introduces polygamy, denies equality of the sexes, abolishes freedom of conscience and religious freedom, and thus abrogates not only Christianity, but liberal democracy as well. Secular Europe is not paying attention to its potentially becoming "Euro-Arabia," as a senior Muslim cleric reportedly indicated in an interfaith meeting at the 1999 Synod of European Bishops: "Thanks to your democratic laws, we will invade you, thanks to our religious laws, we will dominate you" (cited in Dondelinger 2008: 41).

    What this illustrates is the inescapable connection between culture and religion. Notably, religion is the heart of culture, it is what binds individuals and communities, what puts an indelible imprint on people's ways of life, traditions, mores, and "habits of the heart." Europe's present predicament further illustrates that culture does not suffer a vacuum. The "cult" is inherent in culture. The "cult" may be summed up as the overweaning beliefs, attitudes, values, ways of life, and behavioral norms expressed by, and constituting the underlying assumptions of, a particular culture. Note, however, that the "cult" element can be a secular ideology such as Marxism-Leninism, atheism, scientism, various idolatries, including subjectivism or "self-worship" (narcissism), and not just religions, whether monotheistic or polytheistic (Gruenwald 1992). This is why critics of Western secularization and the marginalization of the Judeo-Christian religion and its banishment from the public square caution that the resultant void will likely be filled by some new cult–secular or religious–which would undermine liberal democracy. What, then, is unique in the Western cultural tradition, and why is Christianity a necessary moral and spiritual foundation for liberal democracy?

ATHENS AND JERUSALEM

    While the 2004 EU Constitution was replaced by the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon (still unratified), a more modest effort at streamlining EU institutions and processes, it was remarkable for its underlying assumptions acknowledging classical Greece (Athens) and the Enlightenment as Europe's civilizational heritage, but overlooking its Christian foundations (Jerusalem). Enlightenment rationality or secular reason is now considered by elites on both sides of the Atlantic as the distinguishing mark of modern man and civilization itself. Yet critics point out that (post-)modern men in Western societies are actually living off the cultural capital inherited from Christianity. This insight is also reflected in Maritain's recurring refrain: what the secular consciousness, if it does not veer to barbarism, has learned from Christianity.

    Perhaps one of the best summaries of Christianity's contributions to Western civilization and its most cherished values is D'Souza's What's So Great About Christianity (2008). The central Christian ideas of human dignity, the inviolability of conscience, individual freedom, moral and legal doctrines, and the equality of human beings constitute the underlying bedrock values of Western civilization. In D'Souza's view, the Christian idea of the moral equality and inherent dignity of all human beings was "the propelling force behind the campaign to end slavery, the movement for democracy and popular self-government, and also the successful attempt to articulate an international doctrine of human rights" (2008: 69). The concept of inalienable human dignity and human rights as "natural rights" is founded on the Biblical truth that God created men and women in His image and likeness (Gen 1: 26-27), that every human being is therefore of infinite moral worth, that God loves each person equally, and in fact, sent His only begotten Son, Jesus Christ, Who offered Himself as a sacrifice atoning for original sin, and thus offering the gift of salvation, redemption, and eternal life to all who would accept it (John 3: 16).

    D'Souza also points out that Christianity provided the spiritual basis for the Enlightenment concept of limited government, and the separation of church and state. D'Souza traces the idea of separation of religion and government to Christ's injunction in Matthew 22: 21: "Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's, and to God that which is God's." It was Augustine who elaborated this distinction further in his notion of the two cities–the earthly city and the heavenly city. This meant that Christians had dual allegiances: to God and to Caesar. But the division of the two realms with respect to authority was both novel and significant. In D'Souza's formulation:

"the earthly city need not concern itself with the question of man's final or ultimate destiny. It also implies that the claims of the earthly city are limited, that there is a sanctuary of conscience inside every person that is protected from political control, and that kings and emperors, however grand, cannot usurp authority that rightly belongs only to God" (2008: 51).

    D'Souza thus concludes that the idea of limited government derives from the Christian notion that the legitimate sphere of the ruler is circumscribed and that there are limits beyond which the state and its authority cannot go, and that even elected governments cannot control. Significantly, Christianity extends this space that is off limits to state control to the entire private sphere, reflected in the crucial distinction between the respective spheres of state and society. As D'Souza indicates, the state "refers to the specific and delineated sphere of government authority," whereas society "encompasses the whole range of people's activities" (2008: 51-52). To D'Souza, religious freedom is a "Christian solution" to the problem of division and conflict, while the American founders "extended the concept of tolerance and produced a bold new idea unknown in Europe: freedom of conscience" (2008: 54).

    Yet, what characterizes the Western intellectual and cultural heritage is its embrace of both Athens and Jerusalem, Enlightenment reason and religious aspiration. As thoughtful observers like Jeffrey Hart suggest, both Athens and Jerusalem, cognition and spirituality, are based on the assumption that "ultimately there is a single truth toward which they converge, even if the two paths may not finally meet within human understanding" (2001: 11). What is indeed distinctive and remarkable about Western civilization is its capacity to embrace the polarities and tensions, the conjunctions and disjunctions, between Athens and Jerusalem as a grand narrative in a dynamic interaction and fruitful dialogue. Hart concludes that the Western mind is dialectical, embracing polarities, and that only a civilization willing and able to manage these "can handle the polarities of freedom and order, self and society, reason and love" (2001: 122).

    Hart's final plea is for education and the rediscovery of the liberal arts as the best preparation for citizenship, the cultivation of fairness and disinterestedness. In brief, the re-creation of a character-shaping curriculum, reflecting the classical Greek paideia aiming at "areté, a special kind of excellence" (2001: 20). At the heart of this education in excellence is an understanding of human nature, and the quest for teleos or fulfillment (Gruenwald 2007). Here, again, Athens can learn from Jerusalem. While Plato and the classics emphasized knowledge and the contemplative life as the high road to happiness, Christianity prioritizes moral and spiritual growth which transcends radically the earthly city in its quest for ultimate fulfillment in the City of God. The Christian vision thus ennobles and transforms the classical Greek ideal by the Biblical insight that: "The problem of evil is not a problem of knowledge but a problem of the will" (D'Souza 2008: 58).

CHRISTIAN PERSONALISM

    Jacques Maritain is best known for his philosophy of Christian or Integral Humanism (1973). In contrast to secular humanism, Maritain argued that only a humanism which incorporates the spiritual dimension of human nature, and thus affirms the whole person, can be considered a true humanism. Notably, Maritain's integral humanism draws on such major twentieth-century philosophical currents as personalism, phenomenology, and existentialism. One may even describe Maritain's philosophy as a Christian existentialism. His is clearly not the atheistic existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre's Nausea (1938) or No Exit (1944). An atheistic existentialist believes that man is condemned to endure life in a meaningless universe, and that life would be easier were it not for other people. A Christian existentialist believes that the universe and everything in it is created by God, and that at the apex of God's Creation is man created in His image, a unique being of infinite worth, a living soul, endowed with the divine capacities of reason, free will, and conscience, and destined for perfection, immortality, and eternal fellowship with God.

    At the center of Christian existentialism is thus the notion of the infinite worth of human persons. The leading exponent of the philosophical school of personalism in France was Emmanuel Mounier (1905-1950), Maritain's contemporary. Other notable personalists include Dietrich von Hildebrand, Dorothy Day, Borden Parker Bowne, Gabriel Marcel, Nikolai Lossky, William Stern, Edith Stein, and Pope John Paul II. Martin Luther King, Jr., was also influenced by personalism during his studies at Boston University. It deepened his understanding of a personal God, and contributed to his philosophy of nonviolence. At the core of personalist philosophy is the persuasion that only persons are real in the ontological sense, possess value as unique and unrepeatable, and are moral agents endowed with free will.

    Maritain's integral humanism grafts this personalist philosophy into a Thomistic synthesis which gives priority to metaphysics. To the question of how do we know anything, Maritain's answer is that we come to knowledge by abstraction from sense experience. First of all, we are aware of our own being as an "existent." Second, the Thomistic synthesis focuses on the proposition that the moral law is known to us by "connaturality," that is, the moral "ought" is inscribed in human conscience by the Creator as an "intuition of Being." As Louis Dupré relates, Thomas Aquinas "succeeded in integrating the Aristotelian theory of virtue within a Christian framework" (2008: 18). The classical concept of the "right ordering of the soul" found its corollary in the Christian calling of a moral life. Christianity thus ennobled the classics by conjoining reason, faith, and personal dignity, and declared that all persons, regardless of rank or class, possess equal moral worth.

    Glenn Tinder suggests that personalism may be traced back to Augustine's Confessions. He also notes that proponents of Augustinian personalism–all Christians–include Martin Luther, René Descartes, Blaise Pascal, and Soren Kierkegaard (2007: 102). Tinder notes further that it was probably Immanuel Kant who "opened the door for personalism to enter the mainstream of philosophy" (2007: 102). This may strike some as questionable. But, it was Kant who held that all persons have intrinsic value as ends-in-themselves, and hence should not be used as mere means to an end. Kant's personalist-humanist notion influenced, inter alia, avant-garde Yugoslav Marxist thinkers who developed the most compelling theoretical challenge to Marxist-Leninist teachings based on the writings of the young Marx, proposing a socialism with a human face, a project fraught with great internal contradictions, ultimately doomed to failure or transcendence (Aufhebung) of the Marxist worldview (Gruenwald 1983). But, it is Christianity which is radically personalist. In Tinder's interpretation:

"Christianity is radically personalist in that the roots of all reality–of the heavens and the earth, and everything within them–lie in a person, in a particular being who has a name and who speaks and listens. The universe is created by God. And not only that, it is redeemed by God as well, and redemption comes about through the incarnation of the divine creator in a particular human person, Jesus. The figure of Jesus, both God and man in Christian faith, and as man mysteriously incorporating or representing every man and woman, manifests with great dramatic force the personalism intrinsic to Christian faith" (2007: 105).

    Perhaps this is why Norman Klassen and Jens Zimmermann call for an "incarnational humanism" as a model for genuine university education that integrates knowledge and faith. To Klassen and Zimmermann, "only the incarnation enables a recovery of humanism as the heart of the university education because the incarnation allows us to retain the best elements of the greater humanist tradition and of its postmodern critics without repeating their shortcomings" (2006: 147). The outstanding question concerns the "moral ought," human rights and obligations, and how to find common ground in the face of postmodernism focused on difference and particularity? Tinder recalls that: "The Christian universe, created and redeemed by God, is held together by love" (2007: 105). It is the Christian concept of man as a moral being, a person of infinite worth, that underlies the Western concept of liberty. For Tinder, as for Maritain, the very idea of liberty is eschatological: "Liberty is our primary political need because we are aliens within earthly societies. We are aliens, in turn, because the societies we inhabit are not communities. At their best, they provide conditions–above all, liberty–that allow communication to occur" (2007: 373).

    This brings us back to Augustine's vision of the two cities: the earthly city and the heavenly city. What should be the proper relationship between the two? How can a believer's dual allegiances–to God and to Caesar–be reconciled? Can there be a Christian democracy? How can one reconcile Athens and Jerusalem, the secular and the sacred, knowledge and faith, science and religion, church and state?

A PERSONALISTIC SOCIETY?

    Maritain's integral humanism proposes a personalistic society as a means of advancing a "Christianly-inspired" renewal of democracy. In contrast to D'Souza, both Darryl Hart and Geoff Wells question the wisdom of inserting religion into the public sphere, let alone allowing religion to mix with politics. For Hart, Christianity favors the separation of church and state in that it recognizes the distinctive nature of the two spheres–the secular and the sacred–the earthly city and the heavenly city–with their separate allegiances. For Hart, this is what makes Christianity a secular faith which enables Christians to live hyphenated lives that allow them to participate in public life and to fulfill their obligations to secular authorities (Caesar), while preserving the eternal hope of faith in their private life. As Hart points out, the secular and spiritual spheres are radically different, requiring different approaches and solutions. Hart concludes that: "Because Christianity does not require a certain form of government, a specific kind of cultural expression, or a distinct way of arranging society, its adherents may legitimately live hyphenated lives that are secular and Christian" (2006: 252).

    Joseph Viteritti appears to lend further support to Hart's thesis by pointing out that democratic governance requires compromise in order to work, while religion "instinctively resists compromise" (2007: 212). To Wells, Maritain's conception of a personalistic society seems to threaten the very pluralism it presupposes: "The problem in Maritain's theory concerns the determinant religious context controlling the relationship of the state through the concept of subsidiarity in a pluralist democratic society" (2009: 42). Yet, William R. Marty, the JIS Associate Editor, remarked in the margin while reviewing the manuscript that: "Subsidiarity is the opposite of giving the state the power to impose a religion or other view on others. It preserves, for example, the power of the family, not the state, to have ultimate authority over the education of that family's children. It aids minorities. It does not impose a monistic view on them" (cf Marty 1997).

    There is, indeed, a crucial distinction between society and the state inherent in the Catholic concept of subsidiarity which, however, may be obscured somewhat by Maritain's use of the term, "body politic." But, Maritain's description of the "body politic" sets it apart from the state, and points instead to what we would call today "civil society"–all those intermediate institutions between the individual and the state, such as the family, church, community, voluntary associations of all kinds, labor unions, the market, etc (Byker 2001). In fact, Catholic social teaching on subsidiarity reflects Jeffersonian democracy by placing socio-economic-political decision-making at the lowest practicable level: individual, family, community, city, county, region, nation. Subsidiarity emphasizes local control, effective representation of interests, town hall-style governance, et al.

    It is true that Maritain distinguishes between the procedural aspects and the substantive content of democracy where the latter should be "Christianly-inspired." But, this does not undermine pluralism, since Maritain's "Christianly-inspired" personalistic society relies on free individual choice of citizens in a civil society. In brief, Maritain's project of Christian democracy, self-fulfillment, and the good society emphasizes the priority of liberty:

"the true and efficacious justification of that secular common faith in the democratic charter is the Christian religious faith, the recognition of the transcendent value of the Gospel inspiration, and the Christian philosophy of man and society. Well, that particular justification of the democratic tenets, can by no means be imposed on or required of the citizens by the state, for no philosophical or religious creed can be imposed on or required of the citizens by the state in a democratic society. If we believe that democracy needs Christianity, it is only by means of freedom, and on the basis of the equality of rights of all citizens, that this need for the Christianization of temporal life can be satisfied, and democracy revivified in its genuine sources" (2009: 150).

    Thus, Maritain's personalistic society and its project of a "Christianly-inspired" democracy aspires to conjoin secular pluralism with Christian ethical and religious values. This does not threaten pluralism at all if by pluralism one means the procedural aspects and democratic self-government with constitutional guarantees of basic human rights and freedoms for all, irrespective of political, philosophical or religious persuasion. If, on the other hand, pluralism is taken to mean the absence of any religious values in a society, then such a concept of pluralism is no longer procedural but substantive. And, if the state enforces such a pluralism, it establishes atheism as the state-sponsored religion. This, of course, would undermine the basis of the U.S. Constitution which disestablished religion. In fact, Maritain cautions the church to avoid power politics, while the state should also keep out of church affairs. In brief, Maritain, along with most Christians today, affirms the separation between church and state. This does not mean, however, that religious voices and values should be banned from the public square. This, in effect, disenfranchises religiously-minded citizens. And that is the essence of our contemporary crisis.

    Another prong of Well's critique of Maritain in particular, and the natural law foundation of human rights and virtue ethics in general, is that a teleological conception of human nature dictates to the state a substantive content that appears to undermine pluralism. Yet the teleological conception of human nature has nothing to do with the state, since it is individuals who are called to choose freely the desired ends of human flourishing regarding body, mind, and soul (Gruenwald 2007). Admittedly, the pre-political bodies and institutions of civil society–which include the family, church, community, and voluntary associations–do belong to the "body politic," and indeed their wishes and interests need to be represented in a democracy. Note that Maritain's conception of subsidiarity is akin to civil society, and its intended effect is bottom-up, rather than top-down (determined by the state). In a representative democracy or republic, key social, economic, and political processes are also supposed to be bottom-up, and these processes (not their outcomes) define genuine pluralism.

    To be more specific, in a representative democracy, the state–or rather its institutions–are supposed to represent the wishes, desires, and mandates which the people–the citizens–freely choose and mandate the state organs to carry out. The policies carried out by state organs change in a representative democracy with regular, periodic elections (though circumscribed by multiple factors, national and international, including bureaucratic inertia). In the United States, the state at the federal level reflects the outcome of congressional and presidential elections in which two major political parties–Democrats and Republicans–vie for political power and thus for being empowered ("mandated") to carry out their respective party platforms. In turn, the political parties amalgamate various interests and wishes of a great number of citizens and groups. Thus, ultimately, it is the wishes, desires, and interests of various pluralities in a "civil society" which are to be served by the "state," and not vice versa.

    In one point, both proponents and critics of pluralism and representative democracy might agree with Wells: in the final analysis, it is a question of power. There is an inherent contradiction in Well's argument which, on one hand, praises Maritain's integral (Christian) humanism with its emphasis on individual/personal autonomy and human rights, while, on the other, decrying its vision of a Christian commonwealth because the latter limits pluralistic democracy. However, the key question concerns not religion or irreligion per se, but who wields power in a democratic society, that is, what are the specific means of promoting various interests, goals, and values? The guarantee that Maritain's "Christianly-inspired" personalistic society remains a democracy is his emphasis on the Christian understanding of the nature and origins of man, the priority of liberty, and that human dignity and human rights issue from a Creator, and not from the state.

THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT

    That, indeed, was the genius of the American founders who disestablished religion, while placing the ultimate justification for their endeavor to construct a novum odo seclorum in "the Supreme Judge of the world" (Current 1961: 882). This may surprise some, but the founders trust was in God, rather than human institutions. In fact, the American founders entertained a healthy skepticism regarding all human institutions, secular or religious. They knew that a self-governing democracy or republic has to limit all power, set in place checks and balances, draft a Constitution, and add express guarantees of basic human rights and essential freedoms–of speech, press, association, conscience, religion, political and philosophical persuasion. Yet, while disestablishing religion, the American founders built the new secular order on Judeo-Christian moral/ethical foundations reflected famously in the Declaration of Independence which proclaimed that: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these, are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" (Current 1961: 880). In sum, the genius of the American experiment consisted in conjoining secular social contract theories of representative government propounded by Enlightenment thinkers like John Locke and Baron de Montesquieu with a Christianly-inspired moral/ethical public philosophy which emphasized the priority of God-given liberty, human dignity, and human rights.

    The American founders were clearly heirs to the Enlightenment. They were conversant with the great Western intellectual and cultural heritage from the classics to the Renaissance, and subscribed to the Enlightenment emphasis on reason. But they were equally immersed in the Judeo-Christian moral and spiritual worldview. Their amazing achievement was their unique ability to conjoin these two complementary traditions–reason and faith, Athens and Jerusalem–into a framework for democratic self-government, hailed, among others, by Alexis de Tocqueville in his Democracy in America: "In America, religion is the road to knowledge, and the observance of the divine laws leads man to civil freedom" (1956: 47). Tocqueville was impressed in particular by the character of American civilization which he thought was "the result (and this should be constantly present to the mind) of two distinct elements, which in other places have been in frequent hostility, but which in America have been admirably incorporated and combined with one another. I allude to the spirit of Religion and the spirit of Liberty" (1956: 47).

    Undoubtedly the major issue for the framers of the new democratic order was the question of power. The framers were learned men who read the great works of philosophy and literature, and were astute students of history, aware of the dynamic encapsulated in Lord Acton's dictum that: "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely" (in Seldes 1983: 36). Crucially, Lord Acton's dictum reflects both historical experience and existential truth regarding human nature. To students of the American founding, it is no surprise that the Judeo-Christian conception of human nature animates the founders' philosophy of government, especially concerning the key issue of power. The conviction that no man or institution could be entrusted with unlimited power is based on Christian realism–the Biblical view of human nature as fallen, imperfect, marred by sin, a creature endowed by the Creator with the divine gifts of reason, conscience, and free will, and thus capable of choosing between good and evil, but susceptible to worldly temptations. Hence the need for a socio-political-legal framework which would encourage human flourishing, while containing and correcting for human weaknesses. The solution regarding how to deal with the question of power thus reflects the Christian understanding of human nature, articulated so well by James Madison in Federalist No. 51:

"Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this; you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself" (1961: 160).

    The eminently American solution to the dilemma of how to limit the exercise of power in a democracy was the doctrine of the separation of powers, checks and balances, a written Constitution with a Bill of Rights, an independent judiciary, a free press, a vibrant civil society, religious pluralism, and the priority of liberty with emphasis on God-given (not state-created) human dignity, human rights and freedoms. Perhaps surprisingly, the American founders subscribed to a rather unromantic understanding of human nature, which would require a political framework of institutions and processes circumscribed at every turn. Politics itself is sometimes termed the art of the possible.

    In light of the American founders' understanding of human nature, perhaps both proponents and critics may have to scale back their expectations regarding the promise of democratic self-government. This is also why Darryl Hart suggests that Christians in particular should moderate their expectations of what can be achieved in the temporal sphere of society–the earthly city. Hart encourages Christians to participate in secular politics as citizens, but to confine their religion to the private or nonpublic sphere. Hart concludes that:

"For those unconvinced about Christianity's secular character, it may yet be possible to see that participating in a secular polity, obeying the laws of a state that does not acknowledge God, and paying the taxes of a secular government do not contradict or compromise Christian faith" (2006: 257).

    As a first impression, Hart's strict separation of reason and faith, the secular and the sacred, appears reasonable. After all, the Bible is not a science textbook or a manual concerning the right social, economic or political institutions. Rather, the Gospel's central teachings are moral and spiritual. The Bible offers guides for individual ethical conduct (Ten Commandments in the Old Testament; Two in the New Testament), combined with spiritual regeneration and–given original sin–the imperative for salvation via faith in Jesus Christ. For fallible, imperfect men this side of Paradise, the best possible socio-economic-political-legal framework is representative, democratic self-government which limits and disperses power in society, offers a framework for the amalgamation, brokering, and representation of various interests and groups, while safeguarding basic human rights and freedoms (speech, press, association, conscience, philosophical, political and religious persuasion). But such a democratic framework does not guarantee a perfect utopian society or salvation, but only a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of conflicting wants and interests. To achieve such a novum ordo seclorum, the American founders saw as their major challenge how to limit the exercise of power by any man–prophetic or not–or institution.

    Alas, Hart's understanding of religion, in particular Christianity, is simply as cult or worship, "what church members confess every Sunday when they recite the Apostles' Creed, or when they hear their ministers grant the assurance of pardon and administer the Lord's Supper" (2006: 252). Hart is, of course, correct in assuming that the cult as worship and the theological core of any religion, including Christianity, is properly the sphere of the church, not the state. What Hart overlooks is the fact that the church is part of civil society, and that church parishioners are also citizens. In contrast to Hart's assumption that Christianity has only "meager resources for culture formation" (2006: 251), this essay, and indeed the entire JIS volume, argues the opposite–that Christian ethical and spiritual values are a necessary underpinning for liberal democracy.

    Hart's assumption mirrors the postmodern prejudice which considers Christian symbols and religious ethical and spiritual values as violating the alleged separation of church and state. There is a colossal misunderstanding on this particular issue where a presumed violation of the separation of church and state is used as a pretext to ban Christian symbols and religiously-inspired moral/ethical guides from the public sphere. This, in effect, disenfranchises religiously-minded citizens, leaves a "naked public square," and undermines the Judeo-Christian moral/ethical framework which undergirds the rule of law, human rights and freedoms, and liberal democracy itself.

THE CHALLENGE OF DUAL CITIZENSHIP

    Maritain's project of a personalistic society and a "Christianly-inspired" democratic order poses with renewed urgency the perennial question of how to reconcile the secular and the sacred, Athens and Jerusalem, knowledge and faith (Gruenwald 2005). This essay seeks to illuminate the compatibility as well as the inherent tension between the two realms–the earthly city and the City of God. Notably, religious believers have dual allegiances–to God and to Caesar. What is distinctive about Christianity is its recognition that there are, indeed, two separate spheres of authority, yet that a believer is a "citizen" of both. What remains to be clarified, then, is how religious believers can fulfill their duties and obligations to both God and Caesar.

    Paradoxically, the Christian understanding of the requirements of this dual citizenship has varied over time and space, circumscribed by local customs and traditions, by ethnic and national identities, and tested by various exigencies, including dictatorship and war. Historically, Christians have oscillated between the two poles of taking part as citizens in the secular realm and withdrawing into their religious sanctuary. Darryl Hart encourages Christians to participate in the secular polity as citizens, but not as religious believers, since religion should be private, kept out of the public sphere. In contrast, D'Souza takes Christians to task for just such a double-life and split consciousness–a secular public life and a religious private persona, which not only enervates the Christian faith but also implies a split consciousness and a betrayal of the very public nature of the Christian vocation to be "the salt of the earth" and "the light of the world," which means that "Christians are called to make the world a better place" (2008: xv).

    What is distinctive about Christianity is not only Sunday worship, but witnessing to the Truth which calls for a moral life and service to one's fellow man. The Ten Commandments of the Old Testament spell out the Mosaic Law which establishes normative guides for human conduct reflected in the law. Whereas the New Testament sums up the Decalogue in only two Great Commandments: love of God and love of neighbor (Matthew 22: 37-40). While it is true that Christians are peregrini (pilgrims), that they are in the world but not of the world, nonetheless they are called to witness to the Truth by living moral lives in the temporal sphere, the earthly city. This moral imperative is to be lived according to one's special gifts from the Creator. Just as God's love is relational, a Christian believer's life is also fulfilled in relation to other human beings, beginning with self, family, church, and community, and extending to the nation and the whole world.

    It is the Christian religious faith which has motivated believers in such great social advances as the abolition of slavery, the civil rights movement, the championing of universal human rights, the equality and dignity of all men and women, not just in the abstract, or reserved for Sunday worship, but in real life, and, moreover, for the benefit of all–both believers and nonbelievers. Indeed, religious believers contributed to the resurgence of civic culture and civil society with a common platform seeking universal human rights and freedoms which toppled the communist monolith throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Gruenwald 2000). Robert Wuthnow, for example, praises the global outreach of the American churches, which confirms that American Christianity remains a vital force both at home and abroad in alleviating hunger, poverty, disease, and suffering. In Boundless Faith, Wuthnow acknowledges that: "American Christianity is more engaged in the wider world than ever before. There are more American missionaries, more faith-based humanitarian and relief workers, and more short-term volunteers serving abroad now than in the past" (2009: 235).

    Yet, the postmodern prejudice against Christians persists, which denies the wellspring of their service–the myriad efforts to make this world, the earthly city, a better place–which is their spirituality. The postmodern prejudice is expressed, inter alia, in the concern that Christians aim to convert people to Christianity. Wuthnow also has reservations concerning Christian leaders' describing themselves as "the conscience of the nation" (2009: 248). Admittedly, there is the danger of self-conceit in regarding one's fellow believers as "the righteous remnant." What troubles Wuthnow, and others, in particular, is the absoluteness of Christian moral guides: "To speak of a moral imperative that derives from one's faith can be a powerful incentive for supporting humanitarian efforts, but it can also lead to reckless unilateralism in military affairs" (2009: 248).

    This strikes one as a disingenious assessment of the Christian faith. It is so for two reasons: First, one does not have to be a Christian or a religious believer to behave badly nor to arrive at erroneous judgment or conduct regarding domestic or foreign policy. Atheistic fascism and communism, which denied God and persecuted both believers and nonbelievers, and suppressed all dissent, justified their rule via secular ideologies which spawned the world's most blood-thirsty totalitarian systems whose victims exceed the count of all previous centuries (Gruenwald 1996). Second, Wuthnow himself admits that: "Religious advocacy networks have been outspoken critics of free trade agreements and U.S. military action, and they have been among the most engaged proponents of human rights, peace-building efforts, and foreign assistance" (2009: 236).

    Wuthnow, thus, points to a fact that critics of religion tend to overlook. Namely, the great diversity among religious believers, including Christianity, spans the entire socio-political-ideological spectrum, from left to right, from liberation theology to fundamentalism. Indeed, America, perhaps more than other nations, is blessed with religious pluralism whose beneficial effects include competing for congregants and invigorating civil society. And, if one is to measure the quality and responsiveness of any system of government, it would be by the vibrancy and health of its civil society.

THE PRIORITY OF LIBERTY

    The outstanding question still remains of how to reconcile Athens and Jerusalem, self and society, freedom and order in a postmodern era where the Judeo-Christian moral and spiritual values no longer command universal assent? How can liberals and conservatives, believers and nonbelievers, live together in a society whose members espouse different, and often conflicting, values, interests, and aspirations? Jacques Maritain's vision of a personalistic society offers important guides in emphasizing a common human nature, the desire for personal fulfillment, community, and social justice. To Maritain, the natural human inclination for personal fulfillment and the advancement of the common good call for cooperation. In contrast to his critics, Maritain recognizes, and takes as his point of departure, a pluralism of interests and values, but insists that people can work together on practical issues despite their philosophical, political or religious differences. Crucially, Maritain anchors his futuristic project of a "Christianly-inspired" democratic renewal in freedom and personal responsibility:

"The ways in which Christianly-minded citizens can work at the task of Christianizing the world are on the one hand a temporal testimony to the Gospel spirit in human affairs, I mean an effort to make social justice, freedom and responsibility in everyday life, and all that favors the ends of human personality, shape and animate the structures of terrestrial existence. On the other hand, the ways in question are a direct contribution to the Christian renewal which we hope for, and this means a recasting of our scale of values, and an awareness of the fact that what matters most in human civilization is spiritual experience, as well as the inner union with divine truth which is provided by living faith and love, and that call of the heroes in spiritual life and the gift of oneself which awakens man to what is eternal in him. Finally, nothing can replace in this regard the personal commitment of each individual" (2009: 151-52).

    Maritain's emphasis on the priority of liberty should strike a responsive chord, especially in the contemporary American context, which still treasures personal liberty and free choice. The priority of liberty is perhaps the chief legacy of the American founding. Remember that the American colonists' initial demand was not for independence but for equal rights, that they wanted no more (and no less) than to enjoy the same rights as their British compatriots across the Pond. This expectation and demand for equal rights was articulated in the American colonists' famous manifesto: "No taxation without representation." Could this persuasion of the priority of liberty and free choice yet provide the glue which binds individuals and communities together in a democracy? Both liberals and conservatives, believers and nonbelievers, may agree on the importance of strengthening civil society while limiting the reach of the state and government authority into the lives of individuals, families, and communities.

    How can one apply this principle of the priority of liberty to situations marked by a conflict of interests? Critics of religion who seek to ban all religious speech and symbols from the public square invoke the by-now well-worn phrase, "separation of church and state," which is nowhere to be found in the U.S. Constitution. I propose that this is a colossal misunderstanding of the American framers' intentions and the very clauses in the U.S. Constitution which bar the state or government authority from imposing a state-mandated religion on all citizens, while guaranteeing freedom of conscience and religious expression.

    Take such instances which to critics of religion are bones of contention as, for example, prayer before a sporting event, Christmas nativity displays, depiction of a cross, or posting of the Ten Commandments in public places. All such are said to infringe on the alleged "separation of church and state." Note, however, that in none of these instances is any "church" present. There is no presence of a church as an institution, as an adjudicator, legislator, or executive. In brief, there is no church enforcement authority or exercise of power. This means that the church is not involved at all in typical cases of an alleged breach of the so-called "wall of separation between church and state." The presumption of violation regarding the "separation of church and state" would only pertain if church authorities would both mandate and enforce, that is, make compulsory (with due penalties for disobeying) the voluntary prayer before a sporting or other public event, the viewing of a Christmas nativity display or a cross, or involve an examination of one's life and dispensation of divine justice in accord with the posted Ten Commandments.

    There is a sense, however, in which nonbelievers are entitled to seek redress, that is, if the state collects taxes equally from believers and nonbelievers to fund, for example, Christmas nativity displays disagreeable to nonbelievers. The proper solution would be to allow Christmas nativity displays in a public space, but to insist on private charitable funding. Perhaps the most equitable way to resolve such disputes concerning religious symbols in the public square is by majority vote or referendum, preferably at the local level–city, township, county. If the majority of citizens in a city or community express their desire in favor of displaying religious symbols, the state or government authorities have no constitutional right to thwart the popular will which is simply an exercise of the First Amendment freedoms guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution: religious freedom and freedom of speech. Courts need to recognize that the Constitution places restrictions on government authority, while empowering the people. This intent is stated clearly in the First Amendment which reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; of abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances" (Current 1961: 891).

    It is well-known that, in 1642, the Massachusetts Bay Colony required parents to teach Christian principles. Pundits who regularly cite Thomas Jefferson as the author of the alleged "wall of separation between church and state" need to explain why he proposed a curriculum in 1779 that included religion with the goal of buttressing a healthy democracy. While Jefferson was a deist, he nonetheless thought highly of Christian moral/ethical guides. This is what motivated him to compile the all-but-forgotten Jefferson's Bible (1820), which contained Jesus' moral teachings. C. S. Lewis considered it counterfactual to think of Jesus simply as another prophet or great moral teacher. It is true that, of all the prophets, only Jesus claimed to be the very Son of God. But no one can deny that He was also the best moral Teacher. Both history and experience bear witness to this Biblical Truth.

    When it comes to education, there are important principles that derive as well from the priority of liberty. Just as nonbelievers should not be forced to pay taxes to support religious symbols in public places, so also religiously-minded parents should not be forced to pay for public schools that undermine the essential values parents teach their children at home. The proper solution is vouchers or tax credits for parents to choose those schools, whether public or private, secular or religious, which they deem will best educate their progeny. It is sheer hypocrisy that some so-called liberals, who can afford to send their children to private schools, yet oppose vouchers which would extend free choice of quality education, and likely raise the level of public schools as well.

    In conclusion, critics have a point that Maritain's futuristic project of a Christian democracy may be too idealistic. Nonetheless, Maritain's emphasis on the priority of liberty may yet light the way for a world still in search of a proper balance between modernity and tradition, the secular and the sacred, Athens and Jerusalem, which by now is indeed a global quest (Gruenwald 2008). There is hope that the pursuit of individual freedom and the common good may yet instantiate a rediscovery of the teleological imperative or the moral law inscribed in the heart or conscience of every human being. This, in turn, would reflect Kant's sense of the overall architectonic structure of the universe governed by two sets of laws: laws of nature and laws of freedom.

    Henry David Thoreau, an American classic, who sought a more harmonious relationship between man and nature, was persuaded that "that government is best which governs least" (in Seldes 1983: 682). Albeit, this maxim presupposes that a properly-tuned conscience offers a moral compass and inner freedom which reduces the need, and the occasion, for external controls by government authority and the law. This sheds light on the rationale why the American founders considered the Judeo-Christian religion and morality as necessary supports for a democratic republic. In his 1796 Farewell Address, George Washington articulated the transcendent well-springs of popular government:

"Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, Religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of Patriotism, who should labour to subvert these great Pillars of human happiness, these finest props of the duties of Men and citizens. The mere Politician, equally with the pious man ought to respect & cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of obligation deserts the Oaths, which are the instruments of investigation in Courts of Justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure–reason and experience both forbid us to expect that National morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle . . . . ‘Tis substantially true, that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government" (in Padover 1955: 318-19).

    Even more poignant is John Adams' proposition that: "Our Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other" (cited in Reichley 1985: 105). But this means that both Washington and Adams would consider Maritain's "Christianly-inspired" democracy as self-evident as the Biblical injunction that: "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (II Corinthians 3: 17). At the dawn of the Third Millennium, both traditionalists and postmodernists, believers and nonbelievers, can learn from the wisdom of the ages, reflected by Maritain and the American founding, in order to cultivate a more humane future. In an age of globalization which promises unprecedented advances in all fields, men and women everywhere need to recall the great inspiration driving all genuine progress–the ends of human flourishing, the need for community, and a proper balance between self and society, freedom and order.

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Oskar Gruenwald, IIR-ICSA Co-Founder and Editor-in-Chief, Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies.